Indian Streams Research Journal

Volume : XIV, Issue : II, March - 2024

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL BUDGET CYCLES AND INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE

Vanitha P. N. D/O Narayanaswamy K., Dr. Sushma Rampal

By : Laxmi Book Publication

Abstract :

This paper examines the interaction between political budget cycles and interest group influence within a rational-choice framework. Building on the theory of political budget cycles originally formalized by William D. Nordhaus and extended by Alberto Alesina, the study develops a model in which incumbent policymakers strategically manipulate fiscal policy prior to elections while simultaneously responding to lobbying pressures from organized interest groups.

Keywords :

• Political budget cycles;
• Electoral competition;
• Fiscal policy manipulation

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References :

1. Alesina, A., & Rosenthal, H. (1995). Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy.
2. Alesina, A., & Perotti, R. (1996). “Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions.”
3. Nordhaus, W. D. (1975). “The Political Business Cycle.”

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